Abstract. For the best-choice (or secretary) problem with an unknown number N of objects, minimax-optimal strategies for the observer and minimax distributions for N are derived under the assumption that N is a random variable with expected value at most M, where M is known. The solution is derived as a special case of the situation where N is constrained by Ef(N) <_ M, where f is increasing with f(i) f(i 1) convex.
1. Introduction. In the classical best-choice (or secretary) problem a known fixed number, n, of rankable objects is presented one by one in random order (all n! possible orderings being equally likely). As each object is presented, the observer must either select it and stop observing or reject it and continue observing. He may never return to a previously rejected object, and his decision to stop must be based solely on the relative ranks of the objects he has observed so far. The goal is to maximize the probability that the best object is selected. For a history and review of the literature of this problem and its numerous variants the reader is referred to and . In the best-choice setting, the optimal strategy for the observer is to view kn objects without selecting and subsequently to take the first object, if any, better than all its predecessors, where k 0 and for n > 1, kn is the unique positive integer satisfying If the number of objects is not known, but is a random variable taking values in the positive integers, then minimax-optimal strategies for selecting the best object are known for several situations (cf. , ). For example, Presman and Sonin (1972) derived the optimal stop rules when the distribution of N is known, and Hill and Krengel (1991) found minimax-optimal stop rules (and distributions) when N has unknown distribution but known upper bound n. It is the purpose of this paper to derive the analogous minimax-optimal strategies when N again has unknown distribution, but has expectation at most M, where M is known. Since the arguments in this case generalize easily to the constraint Ef(N) < M, where f is a known positive function for which f(i) f(i 1) is nondecreasing and convex, the proofs will be given in the more general setting. The reader may want to keep in mind the natural case f(i) i, which corresponds to the expected-value constraint.
In the (zero-sum, two-person) game-theoretic interpretation of this problem there are two players, a controller P and an observer Q. Given M > 0 and a constraint function f, player P first picks a distribution for the number of objects, subject to the constraint E(f(N)) <_ M, and then the actual number N of objects to be presented to Q is chosen randomly according to this distribution. Then, knowing only the constraint (and not N itself), player Q begins 1. Introduction. In the classical best-choice (or secretary) problem a known fixed num ber, n, of rankable objects is presented one by one in random order (all n! possible orderings being equally likely). As each object is presented, the observer must either select it and stop observing or reject it and continue observing. He may never return to a previously rejected object, and his decision to stop must be based solely on the relative ranks of the objects he has observed so far. The goal is to maximize the probability that the best object is selected. For a history and review of the literature of this problem and its numerous variants the reader is referred to and . In the best-choice setting, the optimal strategy for the observer is to view k n objects without selecting and subsequently to take the first object, if any, better than all its predecessors, where k 1 == 0 and for n > 1, k n is the unique positive integer satisfying
If the number of objects is not known, but is a random variable taking values in the positive integers, then minimax-optimal strategies for selecting the best object are known for several situations (cf. , ). For example, Presman and Sonin (1972) derived the optimal stop rules when the distribution of N is known, and Hill and Krengel (1991) found minimax-optimal stop rules (and distributions) when N has unknown distribution but known upper bound n. It is the purpose of this paper to derive the analogous minimax-optimal strategies when N again has unknown distribution, but has expectation at most M, where M is known. Since the arguments in this case generalize easily to the constraint E f (N) ::; M, where f is a known positive function for which f (i) -f (i -1) is nondecreasing and convex, the proofs will be given in the more general setting. The reader may want to keep in mind the natural case f( i) == i, which corresponds to the expected-value constraint.
In the (zero-sum, two-person) game-theoretic interpretation of this problem there are two players, a controller P and an observer Q. Given M > 0 and a constraint function f, player P first picks a distribution for the number of objects, subject to the constraint E (f (N)) ::; M, and then the actual number N of objects to be presented to Q is chosen randomly according to this distribution. Then, knowing only the constraint (and not N itself), player Q begins his observation-selection of the objects and receives one dollar from player P if the object he selects is the best of the N objects and pays player Q one dollar if it is not the best.
Formally, the strategies available to the two players are given as follows. For M > f (1) is the set of allowable strategies for player Q, where if strategy q is used player Q stops at object j with probability qj (independently of the rest of the process) if object j is the best so far. If the strategies p, q are used by the respective players, the pay-off function V (p, q), which is the probability that player Q selects the best object, is given (cf. Hill and Krengel (1991)) by
For each value of M >_ f(1), the aim is to derive minimax-optimal strategies PM qM E Q satisfying (2) V(p,q) < V(p,q) < V(p, qM for all p 79, q Q. Example 1.1. As will follow from the main results below, for the optimal strategies when N is a random variable with expected value at most 3, the optimal strategy for the observer is (, 1, 1,...), i.e., stop with the first object with probability , and otherwise stop with the first object thereafter, if any, that is better than any previously seen. Using 16 this strategy, the best object will be selected with probability at least no matter what the distribution of N is, provided its expectation is at most 3. Conversely, the optimal P-strategy (worst-case distribution) for this case is (, 0, ,, 0, 0,...), i.e., there is only the one object with probability , exactly three objects with probability , and exactly four objects with probability ; and against this distribution no stop rule will select the best object with 16 probability exceeding .
That the optimal Q-strategy is monotonic is intuitive (since if it is good to stop at time j with the best object seen so far, it is even better to stop at later times if that object is the best yet seen), but that the optimal P-strategy typically (as in Example 1.1) places mass on two large numbers seems surprising, and it is never the case for the uniformly bounded problem.
In general, the optimal value is a complicated piecewise linear function of the form A / #M for appropriate A and #. It will be seen that there are real numbers a < a2 < ".., such that the minimax-optimal qM is constant over each interval a < M _< a+, while the minimaxoptimal PM is linear in M in the interval and is thus a convex combination of the distributions that are optimal at the end points M a and M a+. is the set of allowable strategies for player Q, where if strategy q is used player Q stops at object j with probability qj (independently of the rest of the process) if object j is the best so far. If the strategies p, q are used by the respective players, the pay-off function V(p, q), which is the probability that player Q selects the best object, is given (cf. Hill and Krengel (1991)) by (1) For each value of M > f(I), the aim is to derive minimax-optimal strategies PM E PM,
Example 1.1. As will follow from the main results below, for the optimal strategies when N is a random variable with expected value at most 3, the optimal strategy for the observer is (13' 1, 1, ... ), i.e., stop with the first object with probability 13' and otherwise stop with the first object thereafter, if any, that is better than any previously seen. Using this strategy, the best object will be selected with probability at least ~ no matter what the distribution of N is, provided its expectation is at most 3. Conversely, the optimal P-strategy (worst-case distribution) for this case is (-f3, 0,13, 13,0,0, ... ), i.e., there is only the one object with probability -f3' exactly three objects with probability 13' and exactly four objects with probability 13; and against this distribution no stop rule will select the best object with probability exceeding ~.
In general, the optimal value is a complicated piecewise linear function of the form A + J-lM for appropriate A and J-l. It will be seen that there are real numbers a I < a2 < .. " such that the minimax-optimal qM is constant over each interval ai :::; M :::; ai+l, while the minimax optimal PM is linear in M in the interval and is thus a convex combination of the distributions that are optimal at the end points M == ai and M == ai+ I. The next example, which identifies values and optimal strategies for an interval of values of M (including the special case M == 3 of Example 1.1), shows typical behavior of the optimal strategies and value as M varies. Example 1.2. As will follow from the main results below, for the expected-value constraint Although the statements of the main results in this article are probabilistic in nature, the proofs are primarily optimization-theoretic. Since general optimization theory saddle-point theorems do not seem to yield a direct solution to the problem formulated here, optimization arguments using a Lagrangian, but heavily based on ad hoc convexity tools, have been developed. In principle, one could use the same techniques to handle a larger class of constraint functions such as those reflecting known bounds on means and variances (or several other moments), but this would involve examination of the many cases corresponding to criticality of the various constraints and is not done here.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces notation, important parameters, and the value of the game and establishes a number of useful identities and inequalities, the proofs of which may be skipped at first reading. Section 3 identifies the minimax-optimal strategy for the observer player Q, which is obtained by solving for the coefficient of pj/j in a Lagrangian, and 4 builds on these results to establish the optimal (worst-case) distribution for N (i.e., the minimax-optimal strategy for the controller player P), and summarizes all the results in the main theorem, Theorem 4.3. Although the statements of the main results in this article are probabilistic in nature, the proofs are primarily optimization-theoretic. Since general optimization theory saddle-point theorems do not seem to yield a direct solution to the problem formulated here, optimization arguments using a Lagrangian, but heavily based on ad hoc convexity tools, have been devel oped. In principle, one could use the same techniques to handle a larger class of constraint functions such as those reflecting known bounds on means and variances (or several other moments), but this would involve examination of the many cases corresponding to criticality of the various constraints and is not done here.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces notation, important parameters, and the value of the game and establishes a number of useful identities and inequalities, the proofs of which may be skipped at first reading. Section 3 identifies the minimax-optimal strategy for the observer player Q, which is obtained by solving for the coefficient of Pj / j in a Lagrangian, and §4 builds on these results to establish the optimal (worst-case) distribution for N (i.e., the minimax-optimal strategy for the controller player P), and summarizes all the results in the main theorem, Theorem 4.3.
2. Notation, preliminaries and the value of the game. The first lemma records some easy convexity results; the proof is left to the reader. LEMMA 2.1. Suppose 9 -+ (0, x). Then (i) 9 is convex (respectively, strictly convex) if and only if 9(i) 9(i 1) is nondecreasing (increasing) in i;
(ii) if9 is convex (respectively, strictly convex), then -]j=k+l 9(j)/(i k) is convex (strictly convex) in > k for each k >_ O.
Basic assumption. Throughout this paper, f(0) 0 and f --+ (0, x) and (3) f(i) f(i 1) is nondecreasing and convex, the canonical example being f(i) _--i.
Let so 0, sk Y'=l 1/j fork _> and for _< k < n, sets sn-s and 1) is increasing and convex on (iv) s/(n k) is decreasing and strictly convex in n > k; (v) F/(n k) is increasing and convex in n > k;
Proof. The proof is routine, using (3), Lemma 2.1 and the definitions of s and Fff.
[] The next objective will be to define some basic parameters that play a central role in the main results of this paper and to establish some useful inequalities and equalities interrelating these parameters. For _< k < n, define a,,k > 0, n, > 0, rnn, > 0, , > 0, An, > 0, and #n,k < 0, as follows" (4) n-k n-k + n(1 Note that a, and n, do not depend on f. Using these parameters, the value of the game VM V(p M, qM) appearing in (2)can now be stated (although proof that it is indeed the value is the subject of the subsequent sections).
Recall that k is the optimal cutoff value for the classical secretary problem with n objects and so s n-ln_ --> > snn-I and k _< kn+l _< kn n t-1. Set rn rn,k, , n,k,, a, c,k,, and ,k,. 
The proof is routine, using (3), Lemma 2.1 and the definitions of sk and PI:. 0
The next objective will be to define some basic parameters that playa central role in the main results of this paper and to establish some useful inequalities and equalities interrelating these parameters.
Note that On,k and Qn,k do not depend on f. Using these parameters, the value of the game vM == V (pM' qM) appearing in (2) can now be stated (although proof that it is indeed the value is the subject of the subsequent sections).
Recall that k n is the optimal cutoff value for the classical secretary problem with n objects and so S~:~1 2: 1 > s~:l and k n :::; k n + (ii) for fixed k, mn,k/an,k and mn,k are increasing in n > k; (iii) for fixed n, an,k is maximized at k == k n ;an,k is increasing in k, 1 ::; k S k n , and decreasing in k, k n ::; k::; n; (iv) for fixed n, mn,k/an,k and mn,k are minimized at k == k n ; they are decreasing in k, 1 ::; k :S k n and increasing in k, k n :S k :S n; (v) an < an < Qn-I; (vi) m n > m n > mn-I;
(vii) an 2:: an+t when k n +1 == kn + 1; (viii) mn,kn+1 :S m n :S m n+l < mn+l,k n when kn+1 == kn + 1; and
(ii) By Lemma 2.2 (vi),
Also, (i), (4), and Lemma 2.2 (vii) give (iii) Observing that n -k -1 > kS~-l, it may be seen that the difference
is ::; 0 or > 0 according as k < k n or k 2: k n .
Qn,k
is ::; 0 or > 0 according as k < k n or k 2: k n . This last equality implies mn'k+l mn,k
From (4), (5), and Lemma 2.2 (vii) note that
which implies that mn,k+l ::; mn,k or mn,k+1 > mn,k according as k < kn or k 2: kn.
putting k == k n and recalling the fact that 1 > s~: 1 gives the result.
(vi) From (5), and it follows using the expression in the proof of (vii) above that
Observe from (8) that mn+l,k+l < Fn n+l and using ns' > n k gives n+l (n-k)mn+l,k+l n8 k (F +1 +l mn+l,k+l O, from which it may be seen that , < rn,+ < m,+l,k, by setting k k, < k,+ and using (iv) above. That mn,kn+, < n in this case follows in a similar fashion.
(ix) The conclusion follows easily from (6) and (i)-(viii) above. [2 The next lemma records some useful identities relating the parameters. LEMMA 2.5. For <_ k < n, the following equations (9) 
Again using the inequality s~=: > (n -k)jn and (8),
whence mn,k -mn,k is > 0 or :::; 0 according as 1 > S~-l or 1 :::; s~-l. From (ii) and (iv) above, m n == mn,k n :::; mn,kn+1 < mn+l,k n + 1 == mn+l.
(vii) Similarly,
which is :::; 0 or > 0 according as k < k n +1 or k 2: k n +1; taking k == k n < k n +1 gives the result.
(viii) Note that
and it follows using the expression in the proof of (vii) above that
Observe from (8) that mn+l,k+l < F;:+l and using nS k > n -k gives
from which it may be seen that m n :::; m n +1 < m n +1,k n by setting k == k n < k n +1 and using (iv) above. That mn,k n + 1 :::; m n in this case follows in a similar fashion. (ix) The conclusion follows easily from (6) and (i)-(viii) above.
0
The next lemma records some useful identities relating the parameters. LEMMA 2.5. For 1 :::; k < n, thefollowing equations (9)-(17) hold:
On,k+lrrtn,k__ On,k(k + 1) 8k_l (1 8 k ). 
Proof It is sufficient to prove just one side of the relations (9)-(12) in each case. For example, for (9) think of the slopes of the lines joining the points (m11"k, a11"k), (m11"k, li11"k) and (m11,+l,k, a 11,+l,k). To prove (9) and (10), first note that
which follows by observing that nks 11,
and To see (9) (and hence (10)), notice that (18) implies that (4) and (5). [] 3 . The optimal Q-strategy. For each pair n, k, < k < n and < j < k + 1, define (19) q'a where an empty sum is zero, and define the strategy q,, (q,,, q,,k2 ,''',qn'k, 1, 1,...).
Using these strategies, the minimax-optimal Q-strategies qM appearing in (2) []
MINIMAX-OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE BEST-CHOICE PROBLEM
The relations (11) and (12) are derived in an identical manner after proving that
which comes from the calculations
CXn,k+l
The identities (13)-(16) may be obtained from direct calculation from the definitions (4) and (5). 
where an empty sum is zero, and define the strategy qn,k == (q~,k, q;,k , ... , q~,k, 1, 1, ... ).
Using these strategies, the minimax-optimal Q-strategies qM appearing in (2) can now be given. q' == 107' 19' 1, 1, . .. , and together these yield the minimax-optimal qM in Example 1.2.
D
First it must be shown that qn,k E Q for all < k < n; that is, each coordinate must be shown to be a probability.
<j<_k+l <n,O<q'k < LEMMA 3.2. For 1.
First, the numerator of qj,k is > 0. This is because An,k + ll, n,kFJ_
Proof.
Ozn,kOZn+l,k
by Lemma 2.2 (iv) and (v) and the fact that F/(n k) exceeds FJ_ for j < k + 1. Denote the denominator of q,k in (19) by/3j. Then to show/j > 0, note that /j /j+l ()n,k "-#n,kFj_l)/j > O, by (21) for j < k + l, so it is sufficient to show that/3+1 > 0. But now, from (4) and (5) calculate that ( ) nF? 1
F:
To show that qj ,k <_ for j _< k + l, note that the statement that qj _< is equivalent to 
But by the convexity of 1/i in i, the left-hand side of (23) is dominated by (n-k)/(n-k-1), which in turn is dominated by the right-hand side of (23) using Lemma 2.2 (iii). Furthermore, (4) and (5) calculate that (22) To show that qj,k :S 1 for j :S k + 1, note that the statement that qj,k :S 1 is equivalent to
Thus it is sufficient to show that "Yj+l -"Yj 2: 0 for j :S k and q~:1 :S 1. First, using (4) and the expressions for the numerator and denominator from above, showing that
is equivalent after rearrangement to showing that
But by the convexity of 1j i in i, the left-hand side of (23) is dominated by (n -k) / (n -k -1), which in tum is dominated by the right-hand side of (23) using Lemma 2.2 (iii). Furthermore,
and since FJ-l is increasing in j and J-Ln,k < 0, to prove that "Yj+l 2: "Yj for j :S k, it is sufficient to show that
re--(n-k) n-k+l #n,k risk_ the last inequality because, by the convexity of 1/i, l(n_k) (1 ) (n-k)(n+k-1)
-< Finally, it may be seen that the right-hand side of (25) exceeds that of (24) It is now possible to prove an inequality that will imply that if the Q-player uses strategy qM, then it forces the P-player to put positive probability mass only on the points 1,2,..., k(M), n(M), n(M) / 1. Recall the definitions of qM and VM. 
the last inequality because, by the convexity of 1/i,
Finally, it may be seen that the right-hand side of (25) exceeds that of (24) using Lemma 2.2 (iii) again.
It is now possible to prove an inequality that will imply that if the Q-player uses strat egy qM' then it forces the P -player to put positive probability mass only on the points 
For strategies p == (PI, P2, ... ) and q == (ql' q2, ... ), recall (1) and define the Lagrangian
The dependence of Lon nand k will be suppressed in the notation. Forp E PM, since J-Ln,k < 
But, using Lemma 2.1 (ii), G + G is positive and nondecreasing and the expression (S_l/(j k + 1)) (sk_/(j k)) is negative and increasing in j > k; hence (Sj+ < for j < n and (Sj+ > (Sj for j > n, which shows that (31) is > 0 when j > k, j n, n + 1, which completes the proof.
Once the analogue of Proposition 3.3 is proved for the P-strategy (Proposition 4.2 below), this will establish the minimax-optimality of both qM and PM and that vM is the value of the game. 4 . The optimal P-strategy and main theorem. For < k _< k, < n, define distribu- [] Now the analogue of Proposition 3.3 will be proved, which, together with Proposition 3.3, will establish the minimax-optimality of qM and PM simultaneously. 
V(p M, el) <_ VM for all q (ql, q2,'" ") E Q.
Proof. 
MINIMAX-OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE BEST-CHOICE PROBLEM
The minimax-optimal (worst-case distribution) strategy PM in (2) for player P can now be shown to be convex combinations of these base strategies p n and pn. and together these yield the minimax-optimal strategies PM in Example 1.2.
D
Now the analogue of Proposition 3.3 will be proved, which, together with Proposition 3.3, will establish the minimax-optimality of qM and PM simultaneously. PROPOSITION 
